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The medico-legal issues raised by 'conscientious objection' constitute a particularly
revealing, though hitherto neglected instance of the emerging relationship between
community responsibility and personal health during the late Victorian period. The
following paragraphs seek to indicate the relevance of a medico-legal approach to
Victorian social history, and to suggest certain areas ofresearch that may well repay
closer study.
The origins of the term 'conscientious objector' are obscure. In Britain, apart
from nominal application to the non-conformist movement in public education, and
its later application to wartime services, it has had major significance in regard to the
anti-vaccinationist movementduring the lastquarterofthenineteenth century. Indeed
the term seems to have been conferred first on religious antivaccinationists in particu-
lar, and subsequently by the Vaccination Act of 1898 on all parents who expressed
scruple of any kind against the vaccination of their children. We must, therefore,
consider the term in its religious sense, and later suggest the importance of its broader
usage.
The religious conscientious objector in the nineteenth century attracted public
attention by his refusal to participate in, or accept the principles of, either allopathic
medical treatment or certain generally accepted medical preventives. By definition,
this refusal was predicted upon adherence to particular religious beliefs which
professed to be incompatible with the customary medical practices of the day. Such
beliefs were ascribed to members ofthe Christian Science faith in its early years, and
to members ofthePeculiarPeople and other 'faith healing' sects. ThePeculiarPeople,
perhaps the paradigm example, based their own medical practices upon scriptural
texts, notably James v: 14-15:
Is any sick among you? Let him call for the elders of the church and let them pray over him,
anointing him with oil in the name ofthe Lord: and the prayer of faith shall save the sick and
the Lord shall raise him up; . . .
For the most part, their activities do not seem to have caused legal action unless the
object ofthe treatment suffered death as an apparent result ofthattreatment. In this
case, the religious issue phased into and became lost amid more complicated argu-
ments ofquackery and malpractice.
It is helpful to illuminate the subject by briefly outlining the historical development
of the public reaction to conscientious objection. Accordingly, one may distinguish
between those actions taken in respect of adult members of society who opt for
heteropathic treatment on whatever grounds, and those taken in respect of children
whose parents are suggestibly liable for malfeasant neglect in the event of death. In
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the nineteenth century, theformer was adjudicated usually on the grounds ofmedical
practice; the latter, on grounds ofparental irresponsibility. Within these two frames
of reference, two different reformist ideologies evolved, one arising from medical or
paramedical professionalism, in which protest was concentrated in, and on behalfof,
the medical profession; the other engendered by public sentiment against ignorant
religious objection, sentiment itselflargely ofhumanitarian or quasi-religious origin.
In the case of death caused by the employment of a medical attendant, or of any
person assumingresponsibility forthe care ofthe sick, by anindividual who has freely
chosen that attendant or practique, the charge of manslaughter was sometimes
pressed. In the early nineteenth century the 'regular' medical profession urged such
charges, usually with little success because it could always be stated in defence that
the medical attendant, by religious prayer or otherwise, fully intended to cure the
patient, and one could not be convicted ofmanslaughter unless one was engaged in
an 'unlawful act'. In colonial Massachusetts, where such a case was first tried (Com-
monwealth v. Thomson, 6. Mass. 134), Lord Hale was cited in the decision that no
man could be forbidden from prescribing honestly for a sick man with the latter's
consent. This decision, specifically applied to the 'Thomsonian' school of hetero-
pathy, seemingly could have applied to religious healers as well, although there
is no evidence that it in fact did. Further cases' supported this decision, until a
comprehensive review was undertaken by the supreme court of Massachusetts
(Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165) in 1884. Byitsdecision, theissue ofmedical
misadventure must be considered on the basis of 'common experience', that is,
whether danger could be commonly supposed to arise from such treatment, however
well-intentioned. The advance of medical science apparently made 'common ex-
perience' reliable, and judicial opinion confident.
Whether or not faith-healing was actually a practice of medicine, and liable to
malpractice decision, depended largely on local definitions of medical practice. In
New York, as late as 1887, medical practice was not defined, allegedly because one
senator declared that a definition would exclude an eccentric healer who had saved
his ownlife.2InNebraska, the statemedical actdefined apractitioner as one'who shall
operate on, or profess to heal, or prescribe for, or otherwise treat any physical or
mental ailment ofanother'. And in the same state, in 1894, the courts ruled against a
Christian Science practitioner, deciding that:
The exercise of the art of healing for compensation whether exacted as a fee or expected as a
gratuity cannot be classed as an act of worship. Neither is it the performance of a religious
duty. ..
The practitioner involved was prosecuted for unlawful practice ofmedicine.3 In this
regard, the different character of English medical law, guaranteeing the freedom of
medical practice with restrictions only against false advertisement of 'qualification'
on the part of non-regularly qualified practitioners, has been formally less severe.
1 New York: Marsh v. Davison 1842 (9 Paige 580). Missouri: Rice v. The State 1844 (8 Mo. 561).
2For this and supporting references see William Purrington, Manslaughter, Christian Science,
and the Law, Medical Record, 1898, 54, 757-761, reprinted in ChristianScience: A Pleafor Children
and other Helpless Sick, New York, E. B. Treat & Co., 1900.
The State v. Buswell (40 Neb. 158), 1894. cf. Ibid. p. 760.
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The less explored facet ofconscientious objection, however, is that concerning the
problem of parental responsibility. Here again, the actions undertaken against
conscientious objectors sometimes provide our best information about their beliefs.
The first case to achieve Victorian notoriety was Reg. v. Wagstaffe in January 1860
(10 Cox. CCJ 30). In this instance, two parents, members ofthe Peculiar People sect,
were indicted for the manslaughter of their child. The charge was based on their
inattention to medical treatment for the child, who was suffering from diarrhoea and
pneumonia; their resort to prayer was ineffective. The task of the court was one of
deciding whether this 'treatment', or lack of treatment, constituted 'neglect' of the
child. Justice Willes held that where parents so acted from conscientious religious
conviction, and not from any intention to avoid their duty, there was not culpable
homicide. If the child had died from want offood, the case for neglect would have
been manifest, but the decision to pursue a different course of 'medical care' at a
time when the efficacy of many allopathic cures was not beyond doubt, could not
constitute manslaughter.
Seven months after this decision, in July 1868, the Poor Law Amendment Act
(31 & 32 Vict c. 122) was passed. Clause 27 of the Act, introduced specifically to
give statutory definition to the word 'neglect', prescribed an offence to arise:
when any parent shall wilfully neglect to provide adequate food, clothing, medical aid or
lodging for his child, being in his custody, under the age of 14 years, whereby the health of
such child shall have been or shall be likely to be seriously injured.
This, ofcourse, altered thelegal position completely, andin 1875, Lord Coleridge, LJ,
confirmed a conviction against a parent who had abstained from medical treatment
on religious grounds (Reg. v. Downes, 45 LJMC 8: 1 Q.B.D. 25). In 1889 and 1894,
however, passage ofthe Prevention ofCrueltyto Children Actshadtheunintentional
effect ofrepealing Clause 27 of 1868. Instead ofthe previous requirement for parents
to 'provide medicines, food, etc.' for their children, Clause 1 ofthe 1889 Act merely
forbade 'neglect' of the child. What definition had been achieved in 1868 seemed
inadvertently to have been abandoned in 1889 and in the subsequent Act of 1894.
The fact of this apparently retrogade action was brought to light four years later
in Reg. v. Senior(68 LJQB 175). This case was significantfortwomajorreasons: first,
it set precedent for most subsequent judicial actions of this kind, and second, it
effectively demonstrated, as the Massachusetts case had done for medical practice in
1884, that medical science had achieved sufficient reliability to permitjust accusal of
anyone denying the benefits of this knowledge to anyone else, regardless of reason.
There was now, it seemed, a consensus of public opinion, quite apart from medical
opinion, which testified to the existence of a minimum acceptable standard of indi-
vidual medical care, which, were the logic fulfilled, would be recognized as the birth-
right ofevery British child. In this case, the father, George Senior, a carman by voca-
tion, was also a member of the Peculiar People sect. His beliefs had not hitherto
aroused the intervention of the law, although seven of his twelve children had, for
unstated reasons, died. Testimony revealed that he was a'kindfather'; now, however,
another ofhis children, eight months old,had died,and medical evidence was given to
the effect that its life would have been prolonged, and probably saved, if medical
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assistance had been secured. Senior was convicted by Justice Willes in November
1898, and the case was bound over to the Court of Crown Cases Reserved. Defence
cited the decisions in Reg. v. Wagstaffe, and Lord Coleridge's opinion in Reg. v.
Downes, and rested on the plea that Senior believed theuse ofmedicines would harm
his child. In view ofClause 1 ofthe 1889 and 1894 Acts there must be, it was insisted,
evidence ofintentional and wilful neglect in order tojustify conviction.
Their Lordships, however, disagreed. Lord Russell of Killowen, LJ, doubted that
the Acts of 1889 and 1894 intended a retrograde step, felt assured, in any case, that
conviction under the 1868 Act was both possible and proper, and confirmed the
decision of Justice Willes. Justice Grantham, concurring, sidestepped the religious
issue and expressed the view that Senior left the child without medical aid and there-
fore acted wilfully, and with wilful neglect.
Senior was sentenced to four months imprisonment at hard labour.4 The decision
rendered was as follows:
A person over the age of 16 who, having the custody, charge or care ofa child under that age,
fails by reason ofholding certain religious views to provide medical aid to such child, when ill,
so as to cause unnecessary suffering or injury to its health, is guilty ofwilful neglect within the
meaning of Sec. 1 Sub Sec. 1 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1894 and should
such child die, or its death be accelerated through such wilful neglect, he is guilty of man-
slauhter ... 'neglect' . . . means that the absence ofsuch reasonable care as an ordinary parent
would ordinarily use for the protection and care ofhis child-the failure to take such steps for
theprotection ofinfant life and health as the general experience ofmankind shows to be proper,
provided that the means of rendering such treatment be within the reasonable competence of
the person on whom the duty to render it rests.
The phrase, 'thegeneral experience ofmankind' is particularly significant when we
turn to consider the issue of conscientious objection towards compulsory smallpox
vaccination. In 1898, the Salisbury Government acted upon the long-deliberated
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Vaccination (1889-1896), and,
interalia, allowed parents to obtain exemption fortheirchildren from the vaccination
laws by convincing a stipendiary magistrate of their 'conscientious objection' to
vaccination.5 Such an objection was widely held by the Peculiar People, and was
based on the belief that vaccination would adversely affect the health of the child.
Vaccination for smallpox, however, was one ofthe most significant contributions of
medicine to society, and was traditionally counted among the values unquestioned
by 'the general experience of mankind'. Why then, in view of the Senior incident
and the Vaccination Act, was the 'general experience of mankind' considered
sufficiently reliable to warrantfaith in medical treatment ofevery kind, yet atthe same
time unreliable enough to excuse the parent from his obligations to accept the most
generally acknowledged preventive against one of the most devastating infectious
diseases? At the same time that the criminal law courts determined not to allow
'conscientious objection' for matters ofpersonal health, where the lives ofonly a few
children would be concerned, the Government was quite distinctly making allowance
for conscientious objection, where the lives of a great proportion of the infant
population were at stake.
' Legal Notes, J. State Med., 1899, 7, 122-3; Lancet, 1898, U, 41, 587, 1651, 1716-17.
5 61 & 62 Vict. c. 49. Cf. FinalReport ofthe Royal Commission on Vaccination, 1896, [c.8270] xlvii.
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A paradox isclearlyevident here, aconsideration ofwhich points to theexistence of
considerable uncertainty in the public mind about the status of medical methods.
Moreover, this paradox suggests that tendencies towards Shavian distrust of the
medical profession, which were to become overtinthe Edwardianperiod,6 werebeing
kindled well before 1900.7
Thevaccinationissueforciblyillustratestherelevance ofthisdistrustand uncertainty
to the study of Victorian society. During the last quarter of the century, the anti-
vaccinationist movement had succeeded in bringing into opportunistic alliance
variant groups of hydrotherapists, nature-cure faddists, and religious faith-healers.
Their arguments against vaccination ranged from post-Jennerian moral outrage atthe
thought of introducing the 'diseased blood of a foul brute' into the arms of pure
children, to more legitimate fears about safety ofthe operation upon newborn infants,
the possibility ofpost-vaccinal complications, and the danger oftransmitting consti-
tutional diseasefrom child to child by the then time-honoured arm-to-arm technique.8
After one of the most vociferous protest movements in Victorian history, this
objection aroused latent medical uncertainties as well, and forced a reversal in the
pattern ofState intervention.9
What explanation can be given for the apparently paradoxical attitude of the
State towards conscientious objection to methods of treatment, and conscientious
objection to methods of prevention? First, it may be suggested that while public
confidence in the medical profession was broadly acknowledged in most general
matters on which there was little difference ofprofessional opinion, the same support
was not forthcoming in matters of a speculative character affecting specific public
interests, about which doctors so distinctly differed. Second, while society could
not excuse the overt omission of parental responsibility in the face ofprimafacie
ill-health, it could assert a public right to question a matter of Government or pro-
fessionally enforced practique, which was debatable both on grounds of the likeli-
hood ofill-health arising from its neglect and on the grounds ofdangers arising from
the operation itself.10
The vaccination issue, gathering momentum from judicial interpretation, had
clear long-term legislative results. When, in 1908, the Departmental Committee on
Inebriates reported that 'The fate of the Vaccination Acts makes it evident that no
' G. B. Shaw, The Doctor's Dilemma: A Tragedy, London, Constable & Co., 1913.
7G. M. Gould, Is medicine a science?, Forum, 1889, 8, 417; H. J. Wiley, What is wanting?,
Indiana J. Med., 1874, 4, 528, cited in W. L. Fox, What is Wanting, Bull Hist. Med., 1962, 36, 270;
Medicine and society, Nineteenth Century, 1895, 37, 1027; The medical profession and its morality,
The Modern Review, 1881, 2, 300.
See E. Haughton, Fallacies of the inoculators, Westminster Review, 1889, 152, (I): 214-219;
(II): 471-474. W. D. Hidden, Dangers of vaccination, North American Review, 1899, 159, 124-127.
Sir J. Clarke Jervoise, Infection, London, Vacher & Sons, 1882. J. H. Bridges, The moral and social
aspects of health, Fortnightly Review, 1878, 28, 562-580.
' This aspect will be treated fully in my forthcoming study of the decline and fall of the State
Vaccination Services.
10 For comments upon the social conception of 'professional despotism', see T. H. S. Escott,
Social Transformations ofthe Victorian Age, New York, 1897, p. 396.
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mode of medical treatment can be successfully enforced by Act of Parliament, and
that any attempt to enforce it would produce more friction, discontent, and agitation
than it was worth.'11 it was clear that the enforcement of resisted law had itself
created freshlaw-making opinion.12 The fact that large numbers ofchildren-between
1898 and 1901, 54-77% of infants under one year of age- were released from the
requirement of vaccination by the award of 'Conscientious Objection Certificates'
indicates that the medico-legal issue at stake was one of broad social significance.13
When it is considered that to a large extent the 'conscientious objector' under the
Vaccination Act of 1898 objected for reasons other than personal whim or religious
doctrine, it is clear that useful correlations may be drawn with the social protests
against diptheria-antitoxin,14 and against the compulsory notification of infectious
diseases.15
Finally, further study of the individuals and groups which protested against
certain widely accepted medical beliefs may reveal that these same individuals and
groups played an important role in movements against state education and state
intervention in general. Indeed the medico-legal approach, by examining these
and other apparent anomalies, may permit further insight into the religious, moral
and philosophical disquiet existing during this time ofrapid development in medical
science and public policy. Atthe very least, the factors which at first seem inconsistent
with traditional historical interpretation may point the way to acloserstudyof'science
and anti-science' during the Victorian period, and may project new formulations
about the changing attitudes of Government and society towards personal medical
care.
ll Report ofthe Departmental Committee appointed to inquire into the operation oftheLaw relating
to Inebriates, and to their Detention in Reformatories and Retreats, 1908. Cd. 4438. xii. para. iv.
12 A. V. Dicey, Law andPublic Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century, London, 1905
pp. 41-47. Dicey's classic work leaves the vast region of medical-legal research unexplored, but
suggests the relevant background against which further studies into the nineteenth century
'revolution in government' may be set.
13 C. Killick-Millard, The role of the 'anti': an apology and an appeal, Public Health, January
1903. For the broader implications of some antivaccinationists' ambitions, see Francis W. Newman,
The Coming Revolution, Nottingham, 1903.
14 Lancet 1898, ii, 1070.
16 R. Hamilton, Compulsory Notification of Infectious Diseases, London, 1883, p. 46; W. H.
Michael, Is it desirable that there shouldbe a system ofcompulsory Notification ofDiseases ? London,
1881.
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